ABSTRACT: This article compares the neoclassical and Marxian theories of the firm. The neoclassical, interpreting the social relations in the production process, in particular the relations of authority and inequality, as flowing from the nature of technology and atomistic preferences, is shown to be incorrect. The Marxian theory which interprets the social relations of the production process as the outcome of class struggle, is supported theoretically and empirically. The Marxian analysis presented herein starts with the labor/
Introduction
This paper contrasts two perspectives on the organization and structure of the production process, neoclassical and Marxist, defending the latter as a more accurate portrayal of capitalist production. Neoclassical theory, in capsule form, views the organization of the capitalist enterprise as the solution to the problem of finding a least-cost technique of production given an array of factor prices. Marxist In Marxist theory, however, the social relations of capitalism cannot be reduced to exchange relations. The essence of capitalism is the exploitation of labor through the private ownership and control of capital on the one hand, and the system of wage-labor on the other. The key concept in Marxist theory delineating the essential nonexchange relations of the capitalist economy is the labor/labor-power distinction. This concept is the methodological basis of Volume One of Capital and was developed by Marx Indeed, Marx argues, the basic categories of profit and wages cannot be understood outside the social relations between capitalist and worker in the production process itself. The sphere of exchange, which appears to condition all economic activity, actually masks the underlying structural relations embodied in the social relations of production.
From the labor/labor-power distinction, it follows that the organization of production in the capitalist firm must reflect essential elements of class struggle. Work [12, 21, 28, 29, 32, 33, 45, 51, 64] . What is needed as well is a structural theory which explicitly links the development of worker consciousness at the point of production to the organizational means of reproducing capitalist hegemony. I Marxist theory recognizes at the same time, however, that the worker is not a commodity, and that the contradiction between worker as commoditized object and conscious, human subject is the driving force of class struggle in capitalist society. Thus the capitalist economy both is and is not reduced to exchange relations, in a dialectic we must capture. The principal contradiction in capitalist production is between capital and labor, between labor as the object of profit and domination and labor as self-actualizing subject. The Indeed it appears that in the course of development of capitalist enterprise, the hierarchical division of labor preceded technical innovation, and accounted for the early success of the factory system over its traditional rivals [45] The decision to supply a good in a perfectly competitive economy is not a decision to supply so-and-so much to such-and-such agents, but simply to exchange so-and-so much of the good for other goods. For the profit-maximizer must take into account in his choice of work organization, job staffing, and wage differentials, the effect of his or her actions on the consciousness of the workers. Since the labor exchange depends on the preferences of workers in addition to their capacities, since the employeremployee relationship tends to endure over many production periods and since the experience of workers in the production process will affect their consciousness, the simple one-product firm faces a joint-product production function: the inputs are raw materials and workers with a certain consciousness and the outputs include both the good produced and &dquo;new&dquo; workers with transformed consciousness. Many of these &dquo;new&dquo; workers will be inputs at the next stage of production. This observation alone invalidates the neoclassical assertion as to the Pareto-efficiency of profit maximization. Moreover, in a general equilibrium system in which all of the usual conditions for efficiency hold, the economic configuration will not in general be Pareto-satisfactory. For there will be a substantive interdependence of the production-possibilities set and the preference functions of individuals. [ Of course the capitalist will buttress the bureaucracy with an &dquo;accountability structure&dquo; including mechanical and human monitors, personnel review boards, spot checks, time-motion men, security guards and the like. But these measures will be more or less costly and more or less effective depending on the consciousness of the work force. Moreover, whatever the structure of accountability, the worker will have a sphere of discretionary control over personal behavior and over information passed on to supervisors. Thus the Weberian model must be rejected. The power vested in the capitalist to structure the rules of the enterprise and to manipulate wage differentials and criteria of promotion and dismissal are insufficient to explain the enforcement of the labor exchange. Consequently they are insufficient to explain the process of extracting surplus value. In addition to these formal aspects of the production process, the capitalist will, in the interests of profits, attempt to structure the consciousness and limit the power of workers. In this section we treat the former: the structuring of consciousness through the organization of work experience. According to our model of the labor exchange, the worker will pursue self-defined goals, subject only to the constraints imposed by the wage, promotion and dismissal policies of the capitalist. But the self-construction of goals is not an individual enterprise; consciousness acquires a class element because workers will normally be influenced by the desires and goals of others in the organization. The types of influence to which the worker is subject and how heavily they affect his or her behavior is of critical importance to the capitalist.
Some of the most important &dquo;ideal types&dquo; of influence may be easily described. We say the worker is superior influenced when his or her behavior is significantly affected through internalizing the premises and goals of the worker's supervisor, subordinate influenced when behavior is affected by the desires and goals of the worker's subordinates, and horizontally-influenced when his or her actions are significantly affected by the worker's hierarchical equals and co-workers.
The structure of influence, some of whose &dquo;ideal types&dquo; are described in the preceding paragraph, will have a considerable impact on the profit potential of the firm. In general, structures emphasizing superior influence and minimizing horizontal and subordinate influence are more conducive to profits. For a major objective of profitmaximization is extracting labor from labor-power. To this end, an authority structure which correctly amplifies and accurately transmits directives from the apex of the organization to its base is of prime importance. As the number of levels in the hierarchy increases, the opportunity for the distortion of directives increases rapidly. Most Many of the considerations affecting the downward flow of directives apply as well to the upward flow of information. The importance of accurate transmission of information among participants in production is important whatever the class structure of the production process. But information relevant to enforcing the labor exchange is especially problematic in capitalist organization. Indeed, it must be seen as an object of class struggle. All of the major decisions of capitalists are based on information over which they have only indirect control. The information they receive reflects both the consciousness of workers and the structure of accountability they impose on the organization. The optimal situation of profits is a full and undistorted transmission of information from the base of the firm to its apex. The actual upward transmission of information will then reflect organizational characterisics and personal attributes in much the same way as the downward transmission of directives. The capitalists will then be fully appraised of the performance of all workers, the extent to which worker speed-ups are feasible and will possess all knowledge workers may have relevant to improving the efficiency of the production process and the efficacy of accountability structures. If all workers identify with the &dquo;goals of the organization&dquo; then no accountability structure will be necessary and voluntary disclosure will provide optimum information. In general, structures of superior influence will increase the supply of information to the capitalist, while horizontal solidarity and subordinate influence will render information unreliable. Co-workers then tend to cover up for one another, mask the limits of productivity of which they are capable and keep to themselves improvements in the production process. They employ such improvements to reduce their work load. [ The ramifications of the need for accountability in the theory of the firm are significant. It cannot be assumed that accountability increases resources devoted to record-keeping, time-punch clocks, and additional supervisory personnel alone. In general, accountability will affect the total job structure of the organization. Production processes must be standardized to render performance easily measurable, decision-making must be fragmented and compartmentalized to create a clear sphere of responsibility for each person in authority, and production tasks must be fragmented to attach clear performance measures to each worker. The extent to which the considerable fragmentation of the working class visible in. modern capitalism is due to the need for accountability, as opposed to the curtailment of horizontal solidarity and the increased efficiency of the &dquo;minute division of labor,&dquo; is of course a matter for empirical investigation. [45] The general assertion that class fragmentation is a normal part of the extraction of surplus value through enforcing the labor exchange, however, rests secure.
Collusion, Legitimacy and &dquo;Divide and Conquer&dquo;
Extraction of surplus value is thwarted when worker solidarity is sufficiently high. But solidarity involves not only common interests and mutual influence, but joint action as well. Thus the capitalist must organize the production process to minimize the formation of worker coalitions.
The threat of worker collusion represents a major reason why the labor exchange cannot be conceived as an exchange of commodities and lends additional substance to the labor/labor power distinction. The labor exchange differs from pure market exchange in the way the capitalist may affect the extent of collusion among the individuals (workers) with whom he exchanges. In the case of market exchange as codified in neoclassical theory, collusion among the trades is handled by an external authority -the state. In the case of the labor exchange, however, recourse to the legal system covers only the most manifest and overt forms of worker collusion (e.g., wildcat strikes). In general mechanisms minimizing collusion must be built into the organizational structure itself.
Collusion between superiors and subordinates, and among co-workers, can swiftly render ineffective the structure of accountability, destroy the downward transmission of directives, and render inoperative the upward transmission of information. Sanctions that can effectively control the behavior of individual workers may be useless when a group of workers is acting in concert. The mechanisms the firm employs to avoid collusion will include the repertoire of devices analysed in preceding sections. The solidarity of a worker coalition depends on the degree of commonality of interests, the benefits accruing to an individual from withdrawing from the coalition, and the severity of the (usually informal) sanctions the coalition can impose on deviant members. The employer can then prevent coalition-formation by fragmenting work-groups, increasing the &dquo;social distance&dquo; between superiors and subordinates, and routing decision-making power through superior hierarchical levels to minimize the degree of control a group of workers may exercise over a co-worker.
But we must add another dimension to our analysis of capitalist production to capture the role of ideology and custom in the reproduction of the social relations through which labor is exploited. [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] is based on the possession of educational credentials even when these credentials fail to increase worker productivity [8; 32] general orientations legitimating the overall degree of inequality in the enterprise will normally flow from the ideologies legitimating the hierarchical division of labor. These general orientations will, however, be far too crude to handle the minute details of wage scales within the enterprise, particularly the wage scales associated with jobs adjacent to the individual's own position, and the wage scales of individuals with whom he has frequent organizational contact. [48] In addition individuals may be affected both by the prevailing rates in the industry as a whole for the particular job they hold, as well as by the expectations generated and reproduced within the enterprise itself. Whatever the mechanism, a particular prevailing pattern of wage differentials may, in certain circumstances, be accepted as legitimate. [20; 53] [2, 18] . 3 . For an extensive bibliography, see [67] . 4 [46] . 6 . The explanation of the high degree of task-fragmentation in modern corporate enterprise is normally given in terms of the dictates of "efficient technology" alone. Our analysis shows that task-fragmentation is a logical outcome of the need to minimize worker discretion and maximize accountability in a situation where workers have no intrinsic identification with the goals of the organization. That is, task-fragmentation is a means of ensuring the integrity of the labor exchange. 7 . These characteristics and others are discussed at length in [35; 49] . 8 
